UNITED STATES ANIMAL HEALTH ASSOCIATION

2026 Resolution

130th Annual Meeting
October 15-21, 2026
Madison, WI

RESOLUTION NUMBER: 19 APPROVED

SOURCE: COMMITTEE ON ANIMAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

SUBJECT MATTER: 72-Hour National Movement Standstill

RESOLUTION:

The United States Animal Health Association (USAHA) recommends that the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS), consider the following changes to the USDA-APHIS-VS Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) 72-Hour National Movement Standstill:

1. Exempt bovine and swine semen and embryos (germplasm) from National Movement Standstill requirements;

2. Prohibit the movement of deadstock off livestock premises during a National Movement Standstill; and

3. Remove the detection of FMD in wildlife as a trigger for a National Movement Standstill and, instead, address such a detection through the establishment of a control area or other appropriate geographic zone.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

The current draft United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) requirements for a foot and mouth disease (FMD) 72-Hour National Movement Standstill are reproduced below:

“For a period of 72 hours, effective [XXX xx, XXXX, XX:00 a./p.m. Eastern Standard/Daylight Time, the intrastate and interstate transportation of the following, from any location in the contiguous United States, is prohibited:

All movements of susceptible animals that are in progress when a national/regional movement standstill is announced should continue to move to their intended destinations. Destination premises should accept all movements of susceptible animals that are in progress at the time of the national standstill notice; this should be supported by states and industry. Reverting animals or returning them to the origin poses serious animal welfare and logistical issues.

Exceptions may be made for critical movements. USDA-APHIS and state officials will determine the characteristics and requirements for these movements (an example would be animals scheduled to move to slaughter within four hours of the movement standstill being announced). USDA-APHIS and state officials may also approve critical movements of personnel or vehicle movements in a control area or onto and off of an infected premises for delivery of feed or veterinary care, for example.

A national/regional movement standstill notice does not affect movement of milk. Premises may continue moving milk to processing. All premises moving milk must implement, monitor, and enforce their premises biosecurity plans to reduce the risk of FMD introduction. States may choose to implement additional or alternative guidance for premises needing to move milk. Live swine, cattle, sheep and goats in transport to Canada will not be permitted to cross the border and should return to point of origin."

One of the key purposes of the standstill order is to prevent further spread of FMD while additional cases are identified. It is important to continually review the requirements of the standstill order to ensure that movement restrictions appropriately address the risk of disease spread.

Semen and embryos (germplasm) originate from some of the most biosecure facilities in the livestock industry. A movement standstill for germplasm could result in adverse production consequences without a corresponding reduction in the risk of FMD spread.

- Resolutions 11 and 12, passed in 2023, provide additional background supporting the exemption of bovine germplasm from an FMD national movement standstill. These resolutions include risk-assessment data and scientific evidence from FMD research conducted globally.

- Resolution 20, passed in 2022, provides additional background supporting the exemption of swine germplasm from an African swine fever (ASF) national movement standstill. A proactive risk assessment of swine germplasm evaluated biosecurity practices and exposure-mitigation measures for ASF.

The removal of deadstock from a facility using vehicles and equipment that move between livestock operations could contribute to disease spread. Because FMD can cause mortality in nursing animals and the virus can remain viable in dead tissue and bodily fluids, moving deadstock using equipment shared among livestock operations or transporting deadstock to a common disposal site could increase the risk of FMD spread.

In the United States, wildlife generally live within established geographic home ranges, although movement patterns vary by species. As such, FMD detection in wildlife may present a different transmission risk than infection within livestock production systems and networks. In addition, wildlife are not part of normal livestock production systems or networks.